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SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATE3
The Senate reswned the consideration
of the nomination or Clement F Haynswonb, Jr., of Soulh Carolina, to be a.n
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
ot the Umted States.
The PRESIDING OFFICER The Senator from Montana. is recognized.
Mr. METCALF. Mr. President. dut1ng
the speech of lhe distinguished and able
Junior Senator from West Vl.rginla. <Mr.
B\'RDI. he had a colloquy with the distinguished Senator from Mtssissippi <Mr.
STENNIS> The Senator from Mississippi
dlbCussed his experience as a JUdge. I am
gomg to begin my remarks with a similar
personal experience because I once
served as a judge on the appellate court
or the State of Montana. the supreme
court of the State. I am going to draw on
my experience as a judge of that court
in considering the nomina Uon of JUdie
Haynsworlh for another court.
When I first read of Judge Haynsworth 's selection. I was pleaaed to learn
that he had a greenhouse In which he
grew flowers and propagated camellias.
I was once a member of an appellate
court In Montana and had a greenhou.oe
to which I came home after the &ri!'Uments and hearings and readln&' of decisions. I enjoyed the opportuolt.y of
making things grow from seeds and cuttings, although to that cl1ma.te camelllas
were diWcult. I felt I had an Identity
with Judge Haynsworth. Had I been required to vote lrnmedlately after hill
nomlnatlon, I would have voted for a
circuit Judge's elevation to the Supreme
Court and for a fellow horticulturist.
When the nomlnat!on of Judge
HaynswortJ1 was first presented I rood a
few ot the cases that he decided-the
LogllJl case. N.L.R.B. v. SS Logan Packmu Co .. 386 R 2d 562; the Deering MUllken case, Deering Milliken. Inc . v. Johnston, 295 F 2d 856: Glendale Manufacturing Co. v. Local 520 ILGWU, 283 F . 2d
936; Sheppard v. Corn.Zius, 302 F 2d 89;
llJld several others. I would not have
come to the same conclusions that Judge
Haynsworth reached, hut W1e opinions
were iawyer-llke and well wrltt.cn. When
I was a member of the Monl.ana Supreme Court, I learned that lv•o Judges

can t.a.k.e the same line on cases and come
to dlll'erent conclusions. I also learned
that the judge who reached an opl)061te

conclusion on one case was often the
Judge who cast the decisive vote to make
your next opinion a majority one. Alter
6 years on an appellate court, I also
learned that reversal o! a lower court 18

not censure or disapprobation. As a former appellate Judge, I approved the
Haynsworth style-<mcclnct, terse, and
closely written oplmons without the rhetoric or llterary flourishes that constitute
many decWons.
The people who are sponsoring Judge
Haynsworth's confirmation are saying
that he ts a "lawyer's lawyer" and a
"Judge's judge." Nothing could be more
absurd. Judge Haynsworth is obviously
a competent lawyer and a pedestrian
writer of optnlons. But tor Innovative
ideas, !orward-looklng concepts, there
are optnlons In every volume o! Ule Federal Reporter that are better than Judge
Haynsworth's.
However. not o.ll o! us can write as
Learned Hand or Louis Brandeis do and
tor m.any of us on appellate courts a
style that Is not redundant and diiTu•e Is

welcome .

Therefore I was prepared to vote to
confirm Judge Haynsworth before the
revelations of the hearings before the
Judiciary Committee. I felt that here
was a kindred soul who likes flowers and
believes In short opinions and Is lawyerlike in hts analysis of the law. Despite
dtsagreement "ith his conclusions I
thought I should acqui<>Sce In his appointment to the Supreme Court.
But when objections were raised and
"hen revelations as to Judge HaynsworUl's financial affairs began to appear
In !.he pa•ss lhen I knew that tn order
tiJ !ulflll n. own constitutional obligations I would have to awalt th~ results
or Ute hearing and do some additional

work And more careJuJ consideration and
n nalysls o! his record
I have never rnet Judge Hayn:-o.worl h.

I have based the following conclusions
on the record JUst ns he in his capacity
as a judge o! the Fourth Ctrcult based
his decisions on the record of the case
before him.
The duty ot confirming the nomination ot a SuPreme Court Justice is dlt!erent !rom that o! adv1slog and consentlng to the appointment ot a Member
o! the Cabinet, or Assistant and Under
Secretaries, ambassadors, and others.
The latter, whether they be Secretary
ot St.ate or U.S. marshal, are only In
otnce durlog the term of the President
by whom they were appointed and the
appolotment is for a limited period.
Insofar as the l udlclary is concerned
the appointment Is tor the lite ot the
judge. ThJs is true at every level. Therefore. the oft repented dictum that the
President should have wide latitude in
his appointments, and unless U1ere is a
sbowlog of moral turpitude or lack of integrity the Senate should confirm, Is not
applicable to nominations to tile JUdiciary. There is a higher standard tor a
Judge. It L• self-evident that Supreme
Court Justices nonunated by President
Franklln D. Roosevelt more !.han 30 years
ago are sWI sitting on lhe Court.
At age 56 Judge Haynsworth would be
a member o! the Court tor 15 or more
yee.rs. The concept that the President,
any President, should have the opportunity to appoint his advisers, and his
bureau chiefs Is not relevant to judicio.!
appomtments. Therefore, in carrymg out
this responsibWty of ours. as Members of
the Senate to advise and consent on the
nomination to the judiciary, we have
higher responsibliities and additional
obligations to the case of a judicial
nominee because the man we confirm
may direct judicial trends tor as many
as the next lhree decades. long after the
President who nominated him has left
omce.
Tills large responsibility ts confirmed
by a study or the ongins of the constitutional provision for Lhe advice and consent of the Senate m the approval o! a
PreSidential nommattun for Judges ol
lhe Supreme Court.
Art.cle II, stcLwn 2 of the Constitution states that t..le President "shall
noDllnate, and by and with the AdviCe
llJld Con"<'nt of Ute Senate, shall appoutt
Judges or the Supreme Court." The ongt.n!U underst.a.ndtng, the practlCe 01 Lde
Senate, and the status of the judtcmry
as a separate branch of Govenuntnt ~\ 11
support the conclus10n the the Seuate
hw; both the right, and the POSttne duty,
to play an active role wben 1t PclSSI!S on
a nomination to the Supreme <..!ourt.
First, until the flnn.l drafts of the ConstttUtlOn, the Senate was given the sole

powt::r over .Suprt.me Court O.ppotnt.ments, wtth the executive to have
sole power over all other ap!JOintments. Succ.:..;sive a ttempt:.s t.o t.ransf e.t
the power to appoint Supreme Cow·t Jusuces to tne ,llres.dent wtre defcutrd.
After those defeats the comprom.st• pursuant. to whtch the PrcsldCliL noiDJu.ill's,
and wu.h t.he advlCt! and con.:)~..ut of the
Scnat.e appoUlts both JUd~;~.:.s auct ul.J,~..:r
olllctn.Is. was adopted-sec. "Tho Dcua..es oi the }<'ederal t:onvcutton or 1787,"
PQgts ~9-40, 56, G Hunt & J l:!J O\\ n,
&!I tors, 10<0. Thus. from the fh st the
partJcular competence of the Senate
to Ule Supreme Court non1inauon~ ha:s
been reco~~ulzcd.
Second, consistent With the Ol'lgl.nal
mderstandlng, the Senate has repeatedly
exercised Its prerogutlves in dee.llng with
Supreme Court nominations. Of the 121
Presldentlo.l nominations to the Court,
a2 have been rejected-nine by vote. 10
by senatorin.I refusal to act, and three by
withdrawo.I ln the face of anticipated
Senate reJection. Thus. as the leading
;tudy In the field notes, very nearly onefifth o! the nominations have fn.lled, a far
1lgher percentage l h•n for any other
>fllct>--Bee J. Harti>. "The Advice and
:::onsent of the &·n,te," 303, 1953
Thlrd. the original understanding and
Senate practice are a rellertlon on the

a.•

unique status of the judwlary The
JUdiciary is not a part of the executive:
it Is an independent and equal branch
of Government. Thus. there 1~ no rC'ason
in pollcy to allow the President a wide
discretion to mold the Fedeml courts to
his own design. To the contrary, in the
situation In which the Chief Executive
errs, it Is the Senate's duty to safeguard
the prestige and reputation of the courts.
In sum. as the Senator from Michigan
<Mr. GRIFFIN) stated in June of this
year:
Under our Constitution the power of tulf
President to nominate constitutes only half
of the appolnt.tng process_ Tbe other hnl!
ltes wlt.h the Senat.e.

The basic arguments against the confirmation o! Judge Haynsworth's nominaUon are well known:
First, Judge Haynsworth has not
shown the capadty to put aside the predispositions and preJudices derived frotn
his private prat·tlce In ord<.'r to render
equnl justice for All unMr law HI' rtcclslons show that he Is lnsf'n:::ltlve to thr
legitimate interests of the blark nnd
working cornmun·tfcs.
Second. Judge Haynsworth hns nuL
meL the high standards or judicial ethics
the Senate set as the first prercqul,lte
for a potential Supreme Court Justice
when It refused to confirm Abe Fortas as
Chief Justice of the United States .
Tilird, Judge Haynsworth's testimony
to lhe Judiciary Committee was shot
through with ambiguity , evasion and
mbrcpresentations. Tile picture that.
emerges from the record is a man wit?
nn abldmg affitlity for inaccuracy. HIS
wholesa!e unwillingness or inabillty to
deal accurately and straightforwardly
with the- various issues ratsed at the
hearings ts obviously a further disqualification for elevation to the Nation's
highest court.
These deficiencies plainly call for Ll•P
reJection of the nomination prC!-.Clltl~·
before us. Howe,er. reJCCllon of lh0
nommaUon in and of ttsclf. fi!) impurlnnt.
n.s tt is, ts not <.'nour:h Thr- SC'nute hw
" duty, to the Nntion, to the Court. nml
to itself, tQ. reaffirm two bn ~ic prccon
dllions to lhe confirmation of a Suprrntc''
Court Justice.
There arc iuchc·atwn~ that Un:-. nonLtnatJon is not an 1sola.ted error. Reports
emanating frum the White How..;p
a."cnbe to the admini:->trnt.ion a Uet<'
minauon to reshape the Supreme Com t
in tts own ilnage. In ligh t of Ju,tgc
Haynsworth's record. 1t JS plain t\lat tins
dctennination is premL,cd on the dcv•.
that the highest quallilcntlon tor n 'Cal
on the Supreme Court 1s complete ideological identification with the . reactionnry tenets ol the ad.mimstratton s
southern strategy. Such a narrowly
polltlcal viewpolnt poisons the wellsprings ot the nomination process and
It allowed to succeed, will inevitably destroy public confidence In the integrity
of our governmental processes.
The Supreme Cow't is the summit of
our legal system. Its powers are of Impressive proportions. The responsibilities
placed upon the Justices are correspondingly weighty. It Is meet and proper that
only lhose who have demonstrated. and
who have been generally recognized ns
having, truly extraord111ary c"pacttY
should receive the hlghe>t honor that a
member of the legal profession can attain The country ha' the right to
demand no les.,,
Thus, It is of the essence that only a
nominee who is or tht• highest dtsttn<.:
tlon-n man who has lil'cd greatly In the
law-be confirmed.
E:o-:cellence is always its own justification. But In this context, it Is more-it IS
an absolute necessity If the Supreme
Couct is to remain abO\'e politics. F>·om
deTr..queville or:. 1t has brf'n rccu nized
that our system of government entrusts
greater responsibilities to the judictary
than any otller. When the Court considers a constitutional question or a
qurstion concerning the mC'aning of a
1

-

Suprt"ne Cnurt of the IJ
major piece of legislation . 1t is raced with
reS(Jl\'ing vital cont!icting interests and
it 1s often guided by only the most general language or by statuton pro\1sions
that are subject to diverse readings.
Those who have no faith in the Judicial
process take this to mean that the Justices are free to do as they please. On this
basis they argue that ideology Is everythin g. I do not share that view. There are
objective trut.hs to be discerned in ansv;ering the questions posed for decision
in the cases. raising both constitutional
and statutory Issues, that- come before
the Federal Courts. The most revered of
our judges, such as Cardozo. Brandeis,
and Learned Hand, merit acclaim on the
ground that their opinions are more
faithful to the intent of the law than
those of lesser judges, not on the ground
!that they were able to Impose their
prejudices on the law through the force
of their office. The com paratively open
tex t ure of the law does mean. howl'ver.
that ascertaining the true answer to the
questions thus posed is a task of the most
extreme difficulty and sensitivity. Great
depth and breadth of knowledge, pre found understanding, and complete selfdiscipline and detachment. are required.
F or if a Justice docs not possess thc.,;e
qualities. experience demonstrates that
the results he reaches will tend to be an
unmastered reflection of personal inclinatl'>n rather than an at..tempt to capture the essence of right n:-ason.
In light of the nature and Ullportance
of the Supreme Court's ,·ole. the only
guarantee s umcient t.o safeguard the
confidence of the people is a nominee of
extraordinary statw·e. For Lhe distingui• hing feature of men of the highest
ca.ltber is that they are not of one piece.
They cannot be captured in catch
phrases such as "liberal" a.nd "conservative ." Their greatness as men , and a!'>
judges. lies In the fact that they see the
complexi ty o! vital ques tions and that
they approa.ch aueh quMtioiil! u their
own man, not aa a ehamplon at a ll&l'row view, or of a ....t, or iJUerMt lrl'OUP·
In a true sense, it 1.s their IQl'lle-minded
tndependence that trurures that no grouP
can capture the Court, and It is this a.ssurance, and this assurance alone. which
can save the nomination process from
the corrosive elfectll o! power politiC'l.
It Ui true. of course. that several nominees of tbe highest ca.llber have been
strongly attacked for their view•. particularlY Justice' Brandeis, and Frankfurter and Chief Justice H ughes.
Let me add that I listened to the able
speech o! the Senat.or from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD). He q:10ted probably
the greatest Member of the senate who
came from Montana. prior to the elevation ot our majority leader, senator
Walsh, who was defending the nomtnation of Justice Brandeis. In tbe Senate.
I am one of the successors of Senator
Walsh. I am in the line of succession. He
was one of the outstandtng lawyers to
serve in the Senate. I concur in everything he 15&id and in everything that was
quoted by the very able Senator from
West Virginia. But he was defending
Justice Bl'andeis. not Jud.,.e Haynswortll.
The important point Is not the vebPmence of these attacks, but that none
of them had a substantia l Impact on the
senate. Its collective wisdom and restraint in passing upon dis tinguished appointments was demonstra ted by the
fact t.hat these nominations were approved by wide margins.
The cntical di1Te rence betv:een those
n ommations and the present one Is that
on the record Jud ge HaynsworLh is not a
m an of the highest stature.
Indeed. none of his adherents , from
th e President on down, claim that legal
excellence v;as the reason for his nomination. Fonner Judge Lawrence E. Walsh.
an ardent supporter of Jud ge Haynsworth . and a man who has served i.n this
and the prior Republican administration,
was ab!e to state only that lawyers and
judges in his area "will put him right at
the top of those who would be eligible for
consideration for thi::; post frmn that cirC'lit."' Since there are only seven judges
0:1 the FoJI'tl1 Circuit. this is h ardly a
s·\\ ~ epm g- endorsement. ~.foreovcr, even
t.J1is faint J)l·ais~ is qualtficd to nothing
by J ·"l~e Walbh 's phrase ·who would be
eligi ble · Smce all of the•,e jud~es arc
ell!oi.Jb1e a .., ~l mat.ter 01 la~. 1L would ap-

Pl~a~· Lllat the commtut"c whose findiwrs
Jud~e Wt\lsh 1·eportl'd would have had Lo
exclude the three rntmbf'rs of t.hr Faun h
CJJTlO.iL \\I..> J.re O\<::: ti.J lldHtse of age.
tlJe two ,uembers ot thai cuurt who ha\·e
serH'd less than 3 Yl':lr~ for lack of exPNicncc. and P<'rhJps the nmnming
judge, Judge Wmtrr. who has compiled
a. forward-looking- record. bt.·cau ... c of
philosophy. For the President has stated
that "age, experience. background. and
philr.:.,ophy" all enter into his calculation•. The unfortunate but inescapable
truth is that even among the members
of t!1e bar who share Judge Haynswort:1·s philosophy. his performance has
aroused no enthusiasm for his craftsmanship, or his depth of vbion. The consensus was well stated by Anthony Lewis,
a re,pected student of the court:
n 1a eu1 to thlnk. of Judicial oonservatives
whoee hl&h 1Atellectua.l qU&l.l.flcatton.s would

bave smothered tbe thought of opposlUon on
pbllosopblca..I (p'OUndiS . The point about
JUdge Ha.ynsworth Is that he does not h~we
such b1gh, 1nte1lectual or legal quA.UficaUons.
Fe'w' would call lt a dts~lshed a.ppolntment ... ThOIOe who feel (policy and ethlca1J
doubta m.t.cbt sa:r that Judge Haynsworth lS
a man from a na.crow bacll:ground who has
not altogether surmo1mted lt In his view of
Ute and the law . . . In :short. the argument
against Clement Haynsworth Is not. that he is
a n evil D'l'a.ll or a corrupt man, or one con.cfoa:aly l:rl.ased. It La that he 1s an lna.dequate
ma.n for a Utettme posl tton of tm.meu.se power
e.nd responS1DUlty In our structure of gov-

ernment. Lewls , The Senate a.nd the Supreme
Court, N.Y. T1mes, Oct. 19, 1969. p. F-14

When a lawyer becomes a judge, his
proper constituency is no longer the special interest group or groups he represented in private practice, but his
constituency becomes the larger one of all
people tn every walk of life. He must put
aside the predispositions and prejudices
derived !rom his pnvate practice, in order to render equal justice for all under
law. Most judges do this successfully. We
often see great growth in awareness of
public problems and increased depth and
breadth of vision on the part of i udges
who were identified with business, or
other special interest groups, before appointment to the Bench. The hist.ory o!
the Court contains several notable Instances of men of exceptional character,
ability, and understanding who outgrew
the more parochial concerns of their
prior experience and brought to their
tasks objectivity and disinterestedness.
In Judge Haynsworth 's case, however.
there is no reason to anticipate such
growth. Not only has be failed to demonstrate the requisite technical skills of a
great judge, but his record as a circuit
judge reveals his ina.billty to sUimount
the preconceptions which he brought t.o
the bench. The most striking examples
are In his deci1ions involving labor relations and civil rlRht.s. The law's basic
policy in these areas was clarified well
beforf' Judge Haynsworth became a Pf•deral judge. In 1935. in 1947, and again 1n
1959, CongreSt< decided that peaceful
concerted activity by working men and
women. that it had not expres~ly declaimed illegal, should be protected by
law. In 1954 the Supreme Court held that
separate school systems divided along
racial lines were unconstitutional. Thus.
Judge Haynsworth was not required to
anticipate new developments in these
ftC'ld~ all that was required was ll'S acceptance of the auti.1orit.ati\"c commat1ds
of Congress and the Supreme Court Yt t..
his labor

drci~ion:-;

rcriect 1.

llctn

ju(ti-

cial actJ. ...·isnl curtaUing the law's protccLion of concertkd act~\ ity. illld Jus cL il
rights derisions demonstrate a rontuluing refusal to follow either the r-;pirit
or the letter of the Supreme Court's decisions. Unlike the couragcou~ C.)tlrt~ of
appeals judges in the South. who have
enforced the law ns set forth in Brown.
and who ha\·e accommodated them.o;elvrs
to the national labor policy, despite Lhe
fact thaL neither are popular with that
region's establishment, be ha.. followed
the path of convemence rather than the
path o! the law.
The only tenable conclusion Is that
U1e administration has chosen Judge
Haynsworth preciselY because of his
demonstrated lack of growth while on
the Fow'th Circuit. It is u-al tn the purs uit o! Its southern strategy is such that
It appears unwilling to chance the appointment of a Justice who wUl decide

S.

vital issues of the day on the merits
The recent controversy over the nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice
or the United States established a 'econd
basic standard that every future nominee
must meet. As the senator from MichIgan (Mr. GRIFFIN) b as stated:
The Senate's role h as been clarified and
st.rengtb.ened. No longer Is It limited mN<'Iy
to ascertain ing whether a member of t.he
Court is "qua.ltfied" In the sense t.ha.t he
possesses some minimum men.'Hlre or ac.t demtc backgrotmd o r experience . . . this
solemn obllga.tion Includes ascer taining
whether the nominee bas sufficient sense of
restraint and propriety. H the judiciary In
general and t he Supreme Court In particular
are to remain secure against tyrannies or all
persuasions, they retain t.he public's trust
and confidence. The oouns must not be
scarred even by suspicions concerning the
financial or political dealings of their mem-

,.,...

The ethics issue has been examined
In depth during the hearings on Jud ge
Haynsworth's nomination. The concluston that Judge Ha.ynsworth has not m et
the standards that the Senate set less
than 2 years a go is inescapable. His failure to cut his financial ties to his professionable clients and to recognize the
hi gh standards of propriety required of
judges. is part and parcel of his failure to
achieve the detachment necessary to the
proper effectiveness of the judicial fun ction.
The documentatwn that Judge Ha ynsworth failed to respond to the blac k
community, indeed that h e was u naware of the legitimate demands has
been made both prior to and after the
decision in the Brown case.
I share the views th a t have been so
ably presented in the committee and
on the Senate floor as to Jud ge Haynsworth's failw·es in the civil ri ghts cases.
But so flagrant have been these fa ilures
that it Is often overlooked that like failure to compt·ehend the social advancements and the national needs in labo r
law have been equally demonst1 ated. I
shaH try to document some or Jud ge
Haynsworth's record of lack of recognition of the legitimate demands of Amenca·s working men and women.
The record of the Federal judic ia ry
over the years in labor cases is one that
signiftcant!y damaged the prestige of the
Federal courts. It is set out in Frankfurter and Green. the Labor Injunction. 1930. The detrimental effects of
generations of ·•government by injunction," of the misappUcation of the Sherman Act, and of the overriding of the
congressional wi U as embodied in section
6 of the Clayton Act. have not yet spent
themselves. There is still widespread
distrust of the courts among working
people.
In light of this historical record, Lhe
maJority report, and the memorandum
1 repared by Senators HRUSKA and CooK
,. ~Ply a voids the- position that a judgt•
who has a record of hostility toward
organized l&bor is fit ta sit on th e High
Court. Instead, both senators attempt
to ar~ue that Judge Haynsworth has not
shown himself to be hostile Loward
labor. The reco rd re buts their position .
It demonstrates that Judge Haynsworth's basic approach is charactenzed
by an insensitivity to the needs and aspirations of workers. and to the plight of
lUlOrganl7.cd employees working for an
antiunion e-mployer in a local environment hostile to unionism. In marked contrast. hP is instinctively ovf'rly s.cnsith·c
to the views of employer:;;, including- rabidly antiW1ion ones.
Here. as in t.he cntical areas of Judicial Ethics and Civil Rig-hts. Judee
Haynsworth has failed to demonstrate
the highly developed sense of judgmenL
and detachment whteh is of the essence
for a nominee to the Supreme Court.
He was an advocate for the text.Hc mdustry before he went on the court of
appeals. and he remained one aft~r he
got there.
I hope that the Junior senator from
West Virginia, who has preceded me will
Rnalyze the following cases before he
votes on Judge Haynsworth's confirmation. if he continues to hold his contenl..ton that Judge Haynsworth is not antilahor

•""r'

r

jup reJ'l"e Court nl the 11 •
The st.atlstlcal basis for the v1ew that
Judge Haynsworth IS hostile to organized labor is overwhelming. First. dw·ing h1s 12 years on the bench, Judge
Havnsworth sat on seven cases involving
tabOr-management relations that were
reviewed by the Supreme Court:

NLRB v M & B Headwear Co .. H9 F
2d 110 <196~). Sobelo!'f and Haynswmth.
JJ. Bryan. J, dissenting.
Taylor v. Local 7. Horseshoers. 353 F
2d 593 t 1965). Boreman. Haynsworth
and Bryan, JJ; Sobelo!'f and Boll. JJ,
dissenting

NLRB v. Rubber Workers <O'Sullivan
Rubber Co . I. 269 F . 2d 694 <19591. re-

NLRB v. Lyma11 Printina & Finishwg
Co .. 356 F. 2d 884 119661. Bryan nnd

versed per curiam 362 U.S. 329 <19601.
Umted Steelu:orkers o/ America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 269 F. 2d
321 U959l. reversed 36 U.S. 593 0960!.

Haynsworth. JJ. Bell. J. dissenting.
Dubin-Haskell LtniiiQ Corp. v. NLRB
386 F. 2d 306 !1967>. Wmter. Sobelo!'f,
Craven, Butzner, and Hnynsworth. JJ.
Boreman and Bryan, JJ, dissenting reversing 375 F. 2d 568 <1962>. Boreman,
Bryan, and Janes, JJ: Sobelo!'f and
Craven. JJ. dissenting.

NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Com.panu. 291 F . 2d 869 < 1961 l. reversed 310

u.s. 9 ( 1962).

Darlington M/o. Co. v. NLRB. 325 F

2d 682 0964>, reversed sub nom.
Textile Workers Union v. Darlinqton M/Q . Co .. 380 U.S. 263 0965).
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.

2d 336 ll968J.
NLRB v Heck's, Inc .. 398 F. 2d 331
( 1968>.
General StPel Products, Inc v NLRB,
398 F. 2d 339 11968\. reversed.
N LRB ,. _Gissd Packing Co . et al , 395
us. 515 119591,
In all seven cases that went to the
Supreme Court. Judge Haynsworth voted
against the labor position.
In all seven cases Judge Haynsworth
was reversed by the Supreme Court.
In six of the cases, the HaynsworLh
position was unanimously reJected by all
participating Supreme Court Justices .
Judge Haynsworth's position was supported by only one Supreme Cow't Justice-Justice Whittaker-in one case.
Thus, Judge Haynsworth's views in labor
cases were reJected not only by those
Supreme Court Justices considered libere.ls. but by such conservative or moderate Justtces as Frankfurter. Harlan.
Clark, Stewart, and White.
There are three additional decisions
which could be regarded as lnbor cases
in a broad sen.oe. though not involving
labor-ma.nagement relations. In each o!
these cases. too, Judge Haynsworth voted
In favor of the employer, and In each o!
them the Supreme Court reversed:
Walker v. Southern Railroad Co., 354
F . 2d 950 ll965l, reversed per curiam
385 u.s. 196 (1966).
Mitchell v. Lublin , McGaughy and Associates, 250 F. 2d 253 0951>, reversed

358 u.s. 201 (1959).
United States v. Seaboard Airline Railroad, 2 58 F. 2d 262 (1958' , reversed 361
U .S . 18 ( 1959) .
Thus, Judge Haynsworth 's overall record in the Supreme Court in the labor
field is 0 out of !~no amrmances and 10
reversals.

Every advocate believes that his case
is a crttical one. But there is only one
objective measure of the importance of
a Federal Ia wsuH: whether the Supreme
Court has agreed to exercise its discretionary power of review. Certainly the
foregoing record conclusively establishes
the proposition that as to vital labor
questions. Judge Haynsworth's decisions
reflect an antilabor bias as measured
against the decisions of the Supreme
Court.
Second, Judge Haynsworth has sat on
17 labor-management cases in which
there was a division of opinion among
Ins fellow judges on the Fourth Circuit.
It may be assumed that these were close
cases. In addition to tile divided cases
that went to the Supreme Court, O'Sulhvan Rubber, Washington Aluminwn
and Darlington, they are:
Textile Workers v. American Thread
Co., 291 F . 2d 894 c1961 l, Boreman and
Haynsworth, J .J .. Sobelo!'f, J., dissentIng.

Lewis v. Lowry, 295 F. 2d 191 0961>,

Haynsworth and Soper, JJ; Sobelo!'f, J.
dissenting.
NLRB v. Quaker City Life Insurance
Co .. 319 F. 2d 690 < 1963!, Bell and Hayns-

wonh. JJ, Boreman. J. dissenting.
Wellington Mill Division, West Point
M/g. Co. v. NLRB. 330 F. 2d 519 (19641
Boreman and Haynsworth, JJ, Bell. J .
d iss en tLng.
Radiator Specialty Co. v. NLRB, 336
F 2d 495 c1964 l. Bryan and Haynsworth,
JJ; Sobelo!'f, J concurring and dissent-

mg.
NLRB ' W II Corp., 336 F 2d 824
1 1964 •, Bryan and Haynsworth. JJ . Bell.

J dissenting.

Weatinghouse Elertric Corp. v. NLRB,

381 F. 2d 542 <1966•. Boreman, Haynsworth. Bryan. and Winter , JJ; Sobelo!'f
and Crave, JJ. dlS'entlng
Schneider Mills , Inc. v, NLRB 390
F . 2d 315 0968 l, Winter, Haynswort.b, Borman, Bryan, and Butzner, JJ;
Sobelotf &nd Craven, JJ, dissenting.
Darlington M/g Co. v. NLRB, 391 F.
2d 760 0968), Butzner, Sobelo!'f, Winter.
and Craven,
JJ;
Haynsworth, J,
dl.ssentlng.
Argv.elle•

v. U.S. Bulk Carrier, Inc.,

408 F. 2d 1065 09691, Boreman and
Bryan, JJ; Haynesworth. J, dissenting .
If Judge Haynsworth had an open
mind on labor matters one vmuld expect
to find a certain balance between his proand antt-labor votes In such cases. However, an examination of these cases discloses that Judge Haynsworth voted
completely or substantially In favor of
the employer 13 times, In favor or labor
only 3 times-Quaker City Life. DublnHaskell Llnilllr Corp. and M & B Headwear Co.-and took a mlddie position
once-Darlington, 391 F. 2d 760.
A qualitative analysis or Judge Haynsworth 's maJor Iabar cases, those that
went to the Supreme Court. is equally
damning. For such an analysis demonstrates: First, that Jud~e Haynsworth
has not grasped a central feature of the
labor policy Congress has constructed;
namely, that the courts are not to Interfere with the right to engage In peaceful
concerted activity unless there Is a clear
and express statutory basis !or doing so:
second, that Judge Haynsworth has exhibited a faculty for stretching employer-oriented arguments far beyond
the breaking poinL In order to disadvantage employees who have opted for
unionization; and third, that Judge
Ha:,:nsworth has not shown the slightest
concern over tl\e harsh consequences to
employees of the tenuous legal positions
he has espoused.
The basic lesson learned from the
judicial performance in labor law prior
to 1931 Is that the courts are unable, on
their own, and without detailed congressional direction to re~Iate labor-management relations. in a fair, e!'fecti\'e and
rational fashion . During that period,
most courts treated the concerted action
of employees as a tortuous and enjoinable conspiracy whenever they re~tarded
the means or obJectives as unlawfu l ;
the only standard or lawfulness was
the judicial view or the desirability or
undesirability of the activities in question. One of the obJectives of Congress
in guaranteeing the right to engage in
concerted activities In section 1 of the
NLRA was to deprive employers of the
weapon of this conspiracy doctrine-see,
International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin
Employment Relati ons Board . 336 U.S.
245, 251-258 (1949 1. Prior to the fourth
circuit decis1on In Washington Alwnunlnum, the NLRB and the reviewing courts
had given e!'fect to labor history by
avoiding' approaching the Interpretation
of conce.r:ted activities in a manner
which would invite scrutiny of the fairness or unfairness. the wisdom or unwisdom, or the desirability or w>desirability
of peaceful activities which are conce>'ted In fact and do not violate a clear
legal mandate.
Washington Aluminum presented the
question of whether peaceful conduct.
otherwlse clee.rly protected by section 7
of the NLRA-ln that case a strike to
protest bitterly cold working condltlon&-risk.s the loss of that protection
If the employee.; do not allow thP employer an opportunity. sulllclent in the
eyes of the court . to correct thPlr

S.

grievance. The fourth circult held that
that protection of section 7 Is available
only where the employees can convince
the courts that they did provide their
employers with such an opportunity. In
doing so, the court of appeals went
countt>r to the basic policy congress embedded In section 1, and against a line
or authority upholding the protected
nature of spontaneous strikes to protest
intolerable conditions--see for example.
NLRB v. Southern Silk Milll, 209 F. 2d
155 <C.A. 6th Cir., 19531 -and It was.
therefore, reversed unanimously by the
Supreme Court.
Judge Haynsworth's failure to grasp
the circumscribed nature of the permissible regulation of peaceful concerted activity was also exhibited in the O'Sullivan Rubber case. In O'Sullivan Rubber.
the issue was whether section 8 rb) c 1 l cA J
of the NLRA, which prohibits "restmlnt
and coercion," could be employed by the
NLRB to prohibit peaceful pirketinr by
a union that had lost its ma jority status
during a strike in \1. hich the compnny
rrplaced the union's mrm bers. Pnor to
1951, the NLRB had recognized that section S<bl <ll <Al did not prohtbit such
picketing. In 1951 the board reversed
itself in Drivers Local 639 <Curtis Bros.\
119 NLRB 232. The District of Columbia
second, ninth, and fourth circuits reviewed the CUrtis doctrine . The Districl
or Colun1bia and second and the ninth
circuits rejected it. Only the fourth circuit accepted lt. The matter then went
to the Supreme Court which affirmed
the District of Columbia Circuit, NLRB
v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 214
l 1960 ) -three justices favoring a remand to the board for consideration of
the e!'fect of section 8 <b l c7l which had
been passed In 1959 and which dealt In
specific
tenns
with
organizational
picketing-and which reversed the
fourth circuit unanimouf>ly.
In Curtis Bros. the Court made it
J)laln that the fourth circuit had fallen
into error by ignoring section 13 or lhe
Nallonal Labor Relations Act which "is
a command of Congrc.'1s to the courts to
resolve doubts and ambiguities in favor
of an interpretation of section 81bl C1 1
1Al which safeguards the rl.ght to strike
as understood prior to the passage of t.hc
Taft-Hartley Act"-362 U.S. at 282and by refusing to heed decisions such
as IBEW v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 , 101-3
11951). which had emphasized the restncted nature of section B<bl <l HA 1.
Thus the error made by Judge Haynsworth. in O'Sullivan as in \Vashington
Aluminum, was to substitute his restricted view of the importance of the
right to engage in concerted activities
for the broader view of Congress.
Whlle not a section 1 case. the Enterprise Wheel decision is a further Illustration of Judge Haynswoth's penchant
for partisan judicial activism. In that
case, the fowth circuit reversed an
award reinstating certain employees on
the ground tha.t the award was unenforceable after the underlying collective
agreement had expired The Supreme
Court. wtth only Mr. Justice Whittaker
dlssentmg, reversed, statlng-363 U .S at.
598-599:
The refusal or courts to review the mert ts

ot an arbitration awa.rd ls the proper approach to arbitration under collectlve bargntnlng agreement!;. The federal poltcy of
se ttllng tabor disputes by arbitration would
be undennlned I! courts had the final s.ty
on the mcrtts ot the award::; • • • plennry
review by a court would mnke mennlngl('~ ·,
the postUon that an arbitration d<'dsion I
final • • •. It is the arbitrators' conMrucll v ll
which wns bargaln<>d tor; and so far as th~'

nrbttrntors' deciston concerns construction
or t.he cont.ract, the courts have no buslneF.~
overrullng him because their Interpretati o n
of t.he cont.ract 1s different from his.

Enterprise Wheel was one of t.hree
companies' cases in which the Supreme
Court outlined the basic contours of the
Federal labor policy on arbt.traLion. Some
of what the Supreme Court said in the.<e
cases was novel in terms of prior conventional learning. The interesting faccL
of Enterprise Wheel, however, Is that the
decision was in no way novel; it was
merely the reaffirmation of a policy.
sound in both the commercial and labor
fields. announced in 1855 in a commercial arb1trat1on case:

'•.
Arblt.rk ton are judges chosen by t.he
pCLrttes to drckte t.he matters subml~ted to
t.br.m ftn~y a.nd without appeal _ As a mode
of ae~Lllns dtsput.es It should receive e\·ery
encouragement !rom courts of equJty. tr the
a.wn.rd Ia within the submtsston, Md eontruns the honest decis ion of t.he arbltrl\tors.
attn a tun and fatr hearing ot t.he parties.
a court of equity w11J not set It astde tor
error f'ither In law or In tact. A contrary
course would. be a subsUtutlon of the judg·
menc. of the Chancellor In place of tlle
judges chosen by the parUes, and would
mnke an award the commencement, not the
end , of lltJgatlton. Burchell v. Marsh , 17 How.
344. 349 (1855 ).

Indeed, as the Supreme Court recognized. the applicability of the principle
of Burchell R~rainst Marsh, in the labor
area was plain in 11iht of section 203 <dl
of the Tatt-HarUey Act which states:
Pinal a.djusunent by a methOd agreed upon
by the puttee Ia hereby decla.red to be the drsln.ble method tor settlement o f grievance
c118putes artelng over the appli cation or Interpretation of an extetlng collective bargainIng agreement

Judge Haynsworth's faculty
for
stretching employer-oriented arguments
far beyond the breaking point to disadvantage employees who choose unionization is most strikingly Ulustrated in the
Darlington case and in the card check
cas es-Geissel Packing, Heck 's, and General Steel.
In the Darlington case the majority of
the fourth circuit, sitting en bane, accepted the proposition that DeeringMilliken, which operated and controlled
numerous textile comp&nies . including
the Darlington Co .. had the s tatus of a
single employer which was r espoilS!ble
for the closing of Darlington as the answer to a representation election \;ct.or:,:
by the Textile Workers Union : the majority then held that the closing wa.,; not
an unfair labor practice on the ground
that "a company has the absolute right
to close out & part of or all its busine,o;s
regardless or antiunion moti ves."
The question of whether a single employer should be allowed to close down
emlrely is an extremely dimcult one
However, a.s the Supreme Court recogIHZed-380 U.S. at 274-271>--tben• 1& no
policy argument at all for allowing a
partial closure based on antiunion
animus:
A d.laatmlnatory partial closing may b.we
rt'prrrusalon a on what. remain.& or the bust~
atrord lns employer leverage for dis1 Hlra.gmg
the free exercise or ~ 7 rlghte
!\tnong remaining employees of much the
:. 1me kind aa that found to exist In the
run.lw.ty shop " and "temporary closing"
c. e,.
Mo reover . a possible remedy open
t11 the Board In such a case. like t.he remedies
R\ :utable In t.be " ru naway shop'' and "temporar~ C' loslng" Ct\.Ses, 1s to o rder reinstatement of t h e discharged employees In the
Othe r parts of the bualnesa. No such remedy
ts avallllble when au enttre business has been
le rmlnated .
ne:...;

The question of the precise circumstances under which a bargaining order
based on authorization cards should be
Issued is also complex. It has troubled the
NLRB and the courts of appeals for a
number of years. On the one hand , It Is
often stated that an election which is not
marred by unfa ir labor practices is preferable to a card check. On the other
hand. In 1947 Congress reJected a propooal to make elections mandatory, and
both prior and subsequent to 1947 the
Supreme Court has held that card checks
are lawful , see, Mine Workers v. Arka nsas
Oak Flooring , 351 U.S. 62 C1956 > Moreover. It is generally acknowled~ed that
the Board 's remedial sanctions are too
we11.k: and depriving the Board of Its
power to issue bargaining orders when
an employer commits substantial coercive
unfair labor practices strips It of Its most
effective weapon.
Because of the balance of these con•ideratlons. the first. second. fifth. and
sixth circuits, the appeals courts other
than the fourth circuit which considered
the matter, rejected the suggestion that
It Is beyond the board's power to tssue
bargaining orders, based on authorization cards, when an e!llployer commits
substantial unfair labor pJ·actlces. Only
the fourth circuit, speaki ng through
Jud ge Haynsworth . accepted 1t. The extreme pro-employer btas or the fourth
c1rcutt's view was recognized by the supreme Court when it stated 1395 U.S .
at 609 >:

tr t.hf' Board could ent~r only a ('ell c-.tnd·
dMiat order and direct an f"lf'Cllon ,,r n
rerun tt. would In effect bf" rewarding thf'
emplO)er "nd alto~,olng him to protl !rum
hl!!.J own wrongful reohts.tl to bar~Ain,
whlle :lt the &ft.ttle llme l'ieH•rely curtnlllng
th~
employHs· rtght !rrf.)ly to d<'lf'rnune
whether they desire o. r~prf'seutatlvt• The
employer could conthluf' to delny or ctisrupt
Lhe election proceMes and put off Jndt'flnltely
hl:. ohllgntlon to bargnln; and nny <'lection
h~ld under these circumstances would not be
likely LO dern.onstra.Le the employees true,
undlstoned desires.

The foregoing demonstrates that in
labor cases Judge Haynsworth's zeal to
ft~rther employer interests has been snch
1 hat he has been blind to the importance
o: Judicial self restraint. to the basic purl> )'>es of Congress in enacting the NLRA.
nd to the guidance furnished by the Sunreme Court--blmd, in other words. to
.til o! the basic virtue.~; supposedly a~.o:;o~
ctated wi th ··strict construct.10nism ·• But
the.., doctrinal pomts do not rell~ct the
totality or Judae Haynswortb's failure.
In the field of labor-management rel a tions. They do not capture the human
POrtion of the legal equation. which
demonstrates that the tenuous legal POsitions that Judge Haynsworth hM e!'poused have had extraordinarily harsh
consequences for the employees mvolved
The fo1·malistic rule of Washln~ton
Aluminum . or some relevance perhaps to
common law code pleading, but not to
modern labor relations. was devised to
dep1ive employees of legal protection
when they engage in peaceful self-help
"for the purpose of trying to correct
conditions which modern labor-management legislation treats as too bad to have
to be tolerated In a humane and civilized
society like ours. Washington Aluminum 370 US. at 17.
In O'Sullivan Rubber, the legal rule
tpprovf'-d by the fourth circuit deprived
over 300 long-time employees or the company of the basic method of concerted
actiOn a vaiiable to them in their fi~ilt to
regain the JObs which they had lost to
stnke replacements while trying to secure
a decent first contact after the union had
won an NLRB representation election
343 to 2
In Darlington. Judg-e Haynsworth
tuok the POSitiOn that a partial shutdown in which over 500 employee6 lost
their Jobs fo- domg nothing more than
expressing their desire for union repre<entation In an NLRB election should
not be considered an unfair labor practice ApparE-ntly 1t was a matter of supreme mdi!Terence to him whether the
remaining employees of the DeerlngMllltken chain were allowed to make
their decision on unionization tree of the
fear of the same type of retaliation.
In Gissel, the company engaged In coPrcive mterro~ation of its employees.
threatened them with discharge and
other economic harm. promised them
economic benefits, and discharged two
of the leading union supporters-all to
destroy the majority position that U1e
Meatcutter's Un1on had secured Jud(lP
Haynsworth's respanse was to ordrr the
company to rehire the d.iscnmina.tecs
and post notices sayin~ that Jt \\·ould
not violate the law again. but to excu. ('
the company from immediate bn rgaining
Apparently the JUdge was unconc.-med
over the fact that the remedy he allowed
wa..c; an mvttation to \·folate the law. and
that It did not alford any proteet1on to
employees who wanted immediate union
representatiOn. rather than rt".!-lpre. rotation many years hence.
The two main J.Il'uments put forward
by Jud ~.: e Haynsworth'.s supporter~ nr«'
that those opposed to the judge's nomination have not Riven adequat«' consid·
erat10n to the unanimous decisions in
which he participated , and t hat anumber of the Supreme Court case.~ and split
decisioros analyzf'd above are mtslnbrled
as anti-labor Neither of thrse nrguments wtll bear mspection.
First. it is my view that whPre there
IS no division of ophuon among Fedrral
Judjites on a QUe!<.lton of law or fact fn a
labor ca<e. the pre.<umptwn ts that the
decision is neither prolabor nor anttlabor
but !'ather 1s clearly dictated by Ia~ Anv
other view i.s dangerously rynkal as t.o
the nature of thP rule of law It i~ only
where the judu:huy IS ~p lit that 11 :11
fairly be said Lhat there are de<J slon,!l
lee ways ..., hlch permll the PXl'I'CI.sf' of a

c;un r,
substantial mea ... ure of pe-rsonal JUrt
me-nt
BenJAmin A Cardozo :-.t.ated a!-. to'Jn,,:-.
111 his fnmr.us study of JHdictal dC'l'i.ston ·
mak111... the nature of the Judll'l,tl
PI ocr:.:s. When I was a mrmbcr of the
Supn•me Court of Montana, I rt'ad nnd
rt~rcact this landmark document In 01 dt•r
to contmue to admonish myself to come
to the rationale of judicial dcci.o.;ionm. king as referred to in Justice Cardozo's
book. Justice Cardozo said:
or the cases thnt come before the court. In
which I sit. a major!Ly. 1 think could not
wtth semblance or reason. be decided In nuy
Wt\y but one_ The law and lt.s a.ppllcnlltlll
allkC' nrc plain Such cases are predestlnt"d
o to speAk, t.o nfflrmance without opinion

Parenthetically. that was probably 1he
~ltuation in the Brwl:-;wick case that ha . .
been discussed. In readmg the Bruns" tck case. there was only one way thr
c.t!-ie could have been decided. Pcth :qJs
that is why Judge Haynsworth forgot thr
case was still pending before h1m.
I shall continue to read from Jusuco
Cardozo's statement in the nature of tht'
JUdicial process:
In another and considerable pcrcen 1.:\~<'
the rule of law Is cer Laln n.nd the appllc.ltlon alone doubtfuL .... compllc,l.t.ed reco rd
must. be dissected. the narratives or wt t.nesses. more or Jess Incoher ent.. and unlnt.clllglble, must be analyzed, to delcrml n& whcth·
er n. given sltuatl.on com<'s within onE' ell::;·
trlct or anothe r upon the chnrt oC rlght:and wrongs . .
. Flnnlly there r t'mnln.!-. :l
percentage. not large indeed, nnd yet uot
so small as to be negligible. '-'·here a de-clslou
one way or the other. w\11 count for the
future, wtll advance or retard. sometime
much. eometlmes little. the developmenl of
the law These are the cases whrre the crcn.
Live element tn the judiciAl process finds 11
op]X)rLunlty and power

Moreover. the QU<">tion before tho Senate is not whether Judge Haynsworth

should be Impeached because he hns
shown an absolutely Wlcontrollable a ntlunion animus which has made it imJl~s
si ble for him to decide even the simpl est
CR!->C properly; it is whether t.he j ud ut•
has shown the professiOnal ability , l.hl'
detachment. the insight. and the untlcrslanding necessary to decide th e complex anrt important cases which con·
tinually come before the Supreme C,)urt
The relatively simple cases that pro·
voke no disagreement nmong courts of
apJ.>("aJs judges do not pro\·ide guid'lnc r
tn answering the I·elevant question T l1c~
are not t.he cases that n•ach the Suprt"'ll•·
Court.
Finally, it should be noted that lilt·
dynamics of labor litigation are such
that it is only to be expected tha tlw
great rnajority of the cases in the fourth
circuit quite- literally compel a decision
In favor of the union. It is for tills Irason that a mere tabulation of these de cisions is of httle or no significnnrr
The two main sources of that court'Fi
labor work aro section 301 arbitratiOn
matters. nnd NLRB matters . The former
normally arise from an employer 's refusal to arbitrate. a ref usal thaL Is nne~
ly, if rvrr. Justiftable under present
law-see United Steelwo rkers v. Am Prtcan Mlo Co. 360 US 564 <1960• The
latter are typically factual cases involv
ing discriminatory dischar ges or other
coercive interference with concerted ac tivtty since unions in the fourth cacull
area are not as strong or well organiZNi
as unions in other areas of the country,
and t:tnployer."i in that area have shown
a stronl{ proclivity for enga({uw. In :->uch
conduct.. These casrs arc M'l'<'en('(l by
the Board's ttcnera l counsC'l. hy n. trial
,.xaminrr, and by thC' Board its('lf. and
undtr the law . the factua l dl'lcrminntlons thnt arc reviewed must be tH·ro rcl cd a large measw·e of respect by tile
courts, Indeed, the major rPA.,.lion tlu.· ~c
cases get to court at all is l hat Board
orders are not self-enforring-. If n company refuse-s to comply. the Board 11111 1
1~0 to court to secure an enfurrct IJ!t· 01 ~
der. Often the type of comJ,any th~r
commits clear unfair labor prac1 H'CS 1"i
the type of company which n·co~JIIZr~
thnt delay works in lt.-; fR \or and tlu. •
a judicial proceedillP .n :1 f1 i\'olou 'ltnttcr is ptefprable t
H>luntal,; \. •,1
pllanc-c.

s.
Under the circumstances tt Is clear
!.hat all but a small number of decisions
should enforce the Board's order. To say
that these factual cases cited In the
Hruska-Cook letter are prolabor Is
ludlcrotL,. Indeed , In another rontext,
that letter itself appears to recognize the
force of this PQint. Thus. while It labels
unanlmous opinion affirming the Board
on substantial evidence grounds "prolabor" It cllsmisses split decisions decided
on substantial evidence grounds as follows:
Of the slxt.een dl\ lded Fourth Circuit cases

wblch the AFL-CIO lists, only ont> was writ·
ten by Judge Hnynsworth. Leu-is v. Lou;ry,
295 F. 2d 197 (4th Clr. 1061), And that was

on $Uf!icief1.C'y oj evidence grounds. Three
addlttonnl cases were on these grounds
(rather than labor-management Issues) and
were thus not "antl-l:tbor" decisions

The Hruska-Cook Jetter's defense of
Judge Haynsworth 's performance in
Supreme Court cases and in ~plit decisions Is equally unsound. It is not true
that the reversals In O'Sullivan Rubber,
Walker against Southern Rail Road and
Enterprise Wheel were "based UpOn
fundamental PQilcy changes by the Congress and the Supreme Court subsequent
to the fourth circuit's decision " In CurUs Bros .. three members of the Court,
Justices Stewart. Frankfurter and Whittaker. took the pOSition that the 1959
amendments to the NLRB had such a
pervasive Impact on the problem that
the case should be remanded to the
NLRB. The rest of the Court disagreed
and decided the case on the basts of the
law as it had been prior to 1959. stating
that the amendments do not "relegate
this litigation to he satus cf an unhn portant authoriy o\·er he meaning of a
statute which has been significantly
changed"-362 U.S. at 291. The opinion
in Walker against Southern Railroad
also demonstrates that the intervening
change in the law which occurred was
not critical to the decision. and as already stated, Enterprise Wheel is notable tor the fact that it does not break
new ground and 1s, in fact, a reamnnation of a rule of Jaw armounced in an
1855 precedent.
Indeed, Walker is especially interesting !or the li&ht it shed on the propOSition that Judge Haynsworth's civil lights'
record is merely a reflection of his preference for a literal approach to Supreme
Court precedents. For, in Walker. he went
counter to Supreme Court authority
squarely in PQint. which as a practical
matter favored labor, on Ute ground that
the reasoning in a more recent case.
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650 0965> indicated a change in U1e
Court's views. It would thus appear that
Judge Haynsworth follows a ltteral approoch where it suits his convenience

and not as a matter of PI,nciple.
The Hruska-Cook letter is equally unsound when it argues that DeerinqMtlliken v. Johnsto71, 295 F. 2d 856 •4th
Cir., 1961t and United States v. Seaboard
Air Line R.R. Co., 258 F. 2d 262 14th Cir.,
195n>, reversed 361 U.S. 78 11959 > are
not "labor cnses." It is, of course, true
that Johnston raised a procedw·al pOint,
whether the Federal Courts could enjoin
a Labor Board hearing, but It is plain
that the Jabo t· context was not irrelevant.
Here again a comparison with Jud~e
Haynsworth's civil rights' decisions IS in
order. The opinion in Johnston is notable
tor Judge Haynsworth's cnticlsm of
NLHB delay•. While there was much
justification tor tbis criticism or the
Board, the judge tailed to note that lhe
compames who were complninm~ or
Board delays, had contributed mightily
t.o them, or that the dtschar~ed employees. not the companies. were the
pnncipal viclims of Board delay. Judge
Haynsworth's stnngent crilicism ot
NLR.B delays contrast>; wtth hts JnduJgence toward the Prince Edward
County School Board in the famous
school closing case. There the court of
f ppeals ruled. in a 2 to 1 opmion by
Jud:re Hayns~<·orlh, that the distnct
court should not, even aftf'r years of
li tlgation, lla ve ruled on lhe school
board's latest evasive maneun•rs without gJving the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia an opportunity to rule ftr:,t,

v. BOCird of Superrisors 322 F' 2d
332 11963 1. The Stmrcme Court disa.greed, declanng:

Gril!in

There hAs been en• u

1'11'

\ L<1< !nnch d('l.h(·r,.

t.lon 9.D<i not. enough speed Gnlftn v Couur.'t
Scllool Goard of Prt?IC< f:duard Count.l./. 3 '7
U.S. 217. 229

As to Seaboard Air Lint', It i~ sufficie11t
to say that there Judge Haynsworth was
faced with a choice between reading the
Safety Appliance Act broadly enough to
srn:e its avowed purpose. the protf'ction
of the life and hmb of railroad "otkets,
even though that might cause som~: additional expense to the railroad, or \·ery
narrowly in order to save the railrofld
money. He chose the latter nnd was rt·versed by the Supreme Court.
Neither the majority report nor the
letter attempt to justify Judge Ha ynsworth's opinions in Washington Aluminum or Darlington: and on the card
check cases they merely relay the following passage from the Gissel opinion:
Despite our reversal ()f the Fourt.h Clrctlit
below
the actua.l area of dil:l&.grePment
between our position here and that. ol t.he
Pourth Clrcult ts not large ILG n praC'tl<"ol
ma.tter

The dimculty with this posJtion is that
the deleted PQrtlon of that quotatt:m
states: '·in Nos. 573 and 691 on all majvr
issues." Normally, the Court goes out of
its way to avoid the appearance cr cnticizing a lower c.:Jurt that it is rcvc·1 siz,~..
The rrn~rsal, especially one that is unanimous. i.s normallv -ufficient to mal-..e :h.::
point. Thus, when the sentence from Gi::.sel is read in its entirety, it is plain that
the portion quoted by the majority was
simply to soften the blow of a unanimous
reversal "on all majnr points."
Finally. the Hruska-Cook letter takes
the view that the decisions in the Wellington Mills case, the Radiator case, the
Wix case and in Arquelles against U.S.
Bulk Carriers are prolabor. This IS incorrect.
Wellington Mills involved in a number
of Issues: the validity of certain notices
pOSted by the company. of certain actions
and statements of supervisory personn('l,
and certain discharges of union activists.
Except for the validity of one statement.
every one of these issues was decided dl
favor of the company by the fourth circuit., which in every instance reversed the
NLHB. ThtL,, unless the rule is to be that
any case that is dectded in favor of employees. or of a union, in any respect 1s
"prolabor" which Is the rule apparently
espoused by the majority. t.here CH n be
no doubt that Wellington Mills is an
antilabor decision. Indeed, despite tlte
fact th1>t the Supreme Court has repentedly stated that it would review evldentary cases only in the most extreme
situation, the NLRB considered the decision in Wellington Mills so destructive
of employee rights that it secured the
consent of the Soliritor General to the
filing of a petltion for certiorari. Wellington Mills was one of two petitions !ll
an evidentary case filed by the Board
during the 1960's. The company. on the
other hand. did not file a petition. Thus
the parties had no doubt who had won
the case and who had lost it.
In Radlat.or Specialties. the court upheld the Board's findings of restraint and
coercion, a finding which led to a simple
cease-and-desist order that cost tlte
company nothing, but reversed the finding that there was an unfair labor prar·t!ce strike. a finding which requlr('d nInstatement of 131 strikers anrl tl>e
payment of substanthd back pay. In Wix.
the court revers{"rl :.ix of t-even Board
findings of dif'crimillatory disch:lr['r-·...
Finally, in Arguelles. where the on v
partieR wcrr rt ~"?man !-iccking bac·~
wages and his employer, there bCltl'' 110
union involved in thr· suit. the fl... urth ri1cmt held in favor c,f the M•o.mt~n nnd
Judge Haynsworth. in dJssent. \'Otr d
against. his securln(~ a recovery ou tlw
ground that whUP neither pnrty v.nYseeking arbitration tt was the preft·rable
method to utilize In settlln~ the d~>.puto
In suppOrting Jud'{r Haynswonh .tt
the hearings. Law1 rnce E_ Wal.~h .statl'd
that the judge was "numing with the
stream of the law ~-..t a slower pace t.han
perhaps some others .. The record demonstrates that in labor law Judge Hayn!':worth Is some 35 years behind the times.
That is simply too slow a pac~ of advance
for a prospective Justice o! the Supreme
Court.
A discussion of Judge Hayns~orth's
financial mvolvement is unnece.s. . al v ut

"
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t ht~ time It has been wtdely dt..;C'ussed
m thf' prf's.~: it has been set for't.i1 t n the
hearmgs~ it has been di~cussed on the
floor. Suflice it t.o say I Ita vc read the
evidence concernin~ the Carolina VcndA-:>.Iattc case. thE' Bruns\\'ick cas .... an<i
others.
The \'f'TY able and dedicated Senator
from South Carolmn. IMr. HOLLINGS'
has emphasized the testi mony of John
P. Frank, who has had several articles
on legal ethics and judtcial procedure
published in the la\v reviews. ~t r. Frank
is a recognized authority. He states that
in view of the facts confronting- Jud~f'
Haynsworth. it was not a violation of
judicial ethics for him to participate 111
the six or so cases where conflict of interest might have occurred . I ha ve great.
respect for Mr. Frank and view his
opinions and his articles as gen uine contributions to the law and the clhico
when a judge has a conflict of int crest..
It is well accepted that in an instance
where there is universal interest such
as in a taxation case. there nrc no
grounds for disqualification. Everyone is
a taxpayer. A special impro\'elncnt tax
or a corporation tax might ben rt iiTercnt
matter. I believe that the d e rninimis
rule, that is , the law docs not take notice
of small or trifting matters, should apply
to cases where a judge is a \'ery minor
shareholder in a large publicly held
corporation. I am not personally concerned abo ut the ethics invoh·ed in the
Vend-A-Matlc case or the Brunswick
case insofar as they are applicable to
Judge Haynsworth as a continuing
member of the Circuit Court. I
agree with Mr. Frank that here is no
violation of statute and no grouncts for
impeachment.
Dut we are not here concerned with
impeachment or criminal indictment.
Certainly Judge Haynsworth on the evidence adduced has not violated any statute nor has his behavior been such that
any valid attack can be made on his
int~grlty as a citizen or a circuit judge.
IIowe\·er, in confirming Judcrc Hayns\\'Orth as an Associ a t.e Justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court. the Srnntc is entitled to. and should utilize, higher
standards than might be employ('d in an
attack upon the il1trgrity or the nc 1 ions
of a sitting judge.
We are entitled at this initial ~ta~C'
to inquire as to how t hr nominrc has
conformed to the standat cis of lho Code
of Judicial Ethics and how the cit.izens
of America will accept his own ethical
record as he hands down his decisions
on the Nation's Highest Court.
The Canons of Ethics of the American
Bar Association admonish a ju<i~e to
not only be "free from impropriety'' but
to ··avoid the appearance or impropriety."
Judge Haynsworth ha.s not "a \'Oided
the appearance of impropriety." His
Vend-A-Matlc activities and his profit of
$450,000 while a director and substonti al
stockholder in the fltm constitutes an
"appearance of impropriety.'' The purchac;e of the Brunswick stock while a
ca~ was .itill l)('ndmg b anolher f"'-ample uf failure Lo avoid "an appe-a rmwe
of Impropriety."
In voting on the advL<:;e-and-consent
motwn. I am goi ng to observe the statutes, t.he Canons of JliC'ttciRl Ethics c,f
the Amrr1can Bar Association, and the
effect. of the appointment on the Ame r~
i<:R.n public in dP<'Idlng: on my vote for

cOIIflnnauun
I hav1: outlined tlw lahor ca·.r-c.; in
v.-hir.h Judge I layn~worth has pat Llt'lpaLed.
In the 10 CU!.("' in \\hi ch JUd'.!.<' HaVli'•W()rth partlCipatPd in labm· problt.·n~~
t.hat. went. to the Supreme Court. all of
them were o\-crt.urned.
Under the conditions I ha\'C previously outlined. hO\\ can we tell a laborer.
a wurkmgman, that Judo!!r Haynswon!l,
v. ho has decided wrong on labor ca.srs
10 times and has l>een O\erruled by the
Supreme Court 10 tunes, sho uld be cun1irmed? As a lawyer and as a former appellate judge, pc·rhaps I can rationaliz~
his optnions. But. looki~lg mto h1s record.
I ca!l "onder if an Atnt"ncan workin ~
man C<tn t.hink that. Jude:e Ha:.·n:-.wo.Th
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would gi\"e him justice . At the circmt
court le\'el the ca:-,es were argued decided. >Uld appealed But at least there
was an appeal and the Supreme Court
had the final decisiOn. A HaYllSWOrth
opmlon was subject to another judgment other than m the fourth circuit
court. If Haynsworth is on the U .S. Supreme Court. his judgment is fmal and
there Is no further appeal.
One further comment--the question of
the impeachment of Justice Douglas ha'
been raised by the min01 ity leader of the
House. If any Member of the House or
Representatives believes he has evidence
justifying an impeachment resolution
he owes It to the Nation. to the Congress, and to his conscience to bring it
now, th1s very day and not use it as tradIng stock to attempt to obtain votes on
an irrelevant matter.
I am p!ad that the Senator from Kentucky cMr CooK, and other Senators
who are vehement s upporters of Judge
Haynsworth"s nominatiOn were equally
as vehement In protesting the equation
of impeachment of Jus tice Douglas with
a vote against Judge Haynsworth's nomInation.
r assure the minority leader e<r the
House if Impeachment proceedmgs are
brought. they will receive the same careful and reasoned response that I have
given t.he case at hand.
In fact, there has been too much bartering for votes already m U1is case. The
activities or employees on the President's
st.aff are well known. Members of the
Senate have been threatened, coerced .
high pres.ured, and offered special project and appomtmcnts. all to &'Cure vote-s
tor Judge Haynsworth's conftnnation .
Tl1e vote ·ror approval or disapproval
of a contested nomination of a Supreme
Court J u&tice may be t.he most lmport.ant
vote we cast m t.he Senate thlS S(" ~ Ion
The results or that vote have already
been clouded by activity outside the Senate. I am convinced that every Senator
Is going to vote his own conscience in
this very delicate but lmport.a.nt Issue.
For a s trong Supreme Court, for a
high regard or JUdicial ethics. for the
protection or tile modern concept or
equal Justice In civil rights and lsbor
cases. I am going to vote agalru.-t oonftnnation

Suorr~

Court of

Mr. President. I yield the floor.
Mr MANSFIELD. Mr President. first.
let rnt' ~ay I \\ant to express agreement
with my dtstlngmshrd colleagur in v. hat
h(' has saici rrlntn-c to impeachment procredtngs ar.ainst a sittJng Justice and the
coincidental sta tc:.'ment. or assumption
that action on th at matter would be tied
to action in the S l•nate on the confirmation or lack of confirmation of the nominatiOn of Jud gr Hnyn s worth . It appears to me, as my dlsltngulshed col-
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IE"a e-ue has sntd . t hat if th r re is any evi-

dence-and I un cic>rstand then• are those
who have bren searchmg for some Limethey nu ~ ht to produc•• it no w. todny-Mr. METCALF This \ ,. ry nfl£>rnoon
Mr l\IANSFlE!.D Yo•.. ll t de~d : nnd it
sho uld have no connt( u on- none what:--Of"n:·r- with whu t the St>natC' w111 do
in:sofar as the nomination of Judge
H ay n~ w onh b concerned.
Ett bcr they ha' .... enough for impeachment o r they haH· no t.: and 1f they have.
lhoy ought to produce It and let the
process for hn pcn chment begin. It will
have to be dec1ded h ere. 1f they have
c;ufficient C\"idcncC' It they have not.
lhen they oug ht to observe the advice
of thei ,. Pre ~ id e n t and lower theIr voices.
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